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Abstract—A cognitive radio network where an incumbent
primary operator and an entrant secondary operator compete for
users is modeled using queueing and game theory. The economic
viability of supporting the secondary operator service using an
opportunistic access to the spectrum owned by the primary
operator is assessed. Against the benchmark of the primary
operator operating as a monopolist, we show that the entry of the
secondary operator is desirable from an efficiency perspective,
since the carried traffic increases. Additionally, for a range of
parameter values, a lump sum payment can be designed so that
the incumbent operator has an incentive to let the secondary
operator enter. Additionally, the opportunistic access setting has
been compared against a leasing-based alternative, and we have
concluded that the former outperforms the latter in terms of
efficiency and incentive.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cognitive radio technologies for spectrum sharing have
received an enormous interest from the research community
for the last decade, and more recently from regulators and
mobile operators [1]. Whichever technical solution will be
finally deployed, there is an agreement among regulators
and operators that spectrum sharing opportunities will only
emerge if both quality of service guarantees and market-based
incentives are agreed between sharing partners [2]. This paper
focuses on the latter, that is, on the economical transactions
that will provide incentives to mobile operators to engage in
cognitive radio-based spectrum sharing schemes.
There are some contributions on the modeling of the eco-
nomical interactions between primary and secondary operators
in cognitive radio networks. Reference [3] analyzes spectrum
leasing in cognitive radio networks and derives primary profit-
maximizing pricing schemes for the leasing transaction; there
is no explicit modeling of the secondary operator. Refer-
ence [4] (respectively, Reference [5]) analyzes the spectrum
leasing transaction between one primary operator and many
secondary operators (respectively, many primary operators and
one secondary operator), under a user behavior modeled by a
demand function. However, primary and secondary operators
are providing services in disjoint markets, so that no interaction
in the service provision is modeled. We are concerned with
the interaction between primary and secondary operators at
both the operational and the economincal level. Actually, we
have previously worked in such sort of models in [6] and [7],
where spectrum leasing was agreed between a primary and a
secondary operator, and then service competition took place.
Still, once the leasing transaction was completed, there would
be no further cross effect on the quality of the service provided
by the operators.
Our focus in this paper is to proceed one step further
and model both the economical interaction, by means of price
competition, and the operational interaction—as we describe in
next section, we use priority queueing for the latter. There are
many works on the provision of differentiated service by means
of priority queueing, motivated by seminal papers such as
[8]. The role of pricing in differentiated servicing is analyzed
in papers such as [9] and [10]. We are indebted specifically
to [11], [12] and [13]. The first one analyzes pricing in a
communications network; it investigates priority queueing as a
way to differentiate between users with heterogeneous service
requirements. The other ones extend the model to analyze
the effects of using processor-sharing discriplines. However,
these works only model one network operator, that is, the
competition pressure is absent. Instead, we explicitly model
competing operators which extract revenues flow from the
service that each priority class receives. This model requires a
different analysis compared with the above papers.
The paper is structured as follows. Next section describes
the queueing model and the payment relationships, whereas
Section III describes the specific game that is used to model
the interaction. Section IV analyzes the baseline case where
the primary operator is a monopolist, and Section V analyzes
the dupoly case, computes numerical values, and compares
the duopoly and the monopoly cases. Section VI analyzes an
alternative setting with spectrum leasing and no opportunistic
access, and finally Section VII draws the conclusions.
II. GENERAL MODEL
We model a duopoly where mobile communication users
pay for the packet-delivery service offered by two competing
operators. One of the operators holds a spectrum license, and
the other one does not. The latter coordinates subscribers ac-
cess to the spectrum licensed to the former in an opportunistic
manner using cognitive radio technologies. Hence, we denote
the former as either incumbent or primary operator, and the
latter, as entrant or secondary operator.
We assume that the spectrum access implemented and coor-
dinated by the secondary operator does not cause a significant
impact in the quality of service received by primary operator’s
subscribers. Therefore, we model this service delivery using a
single-server Priority Queue (Fig. 1), where the users that pay
for primary operator’s service are priority users, and those ones
that pay for secondary operator’s service are ordinary users. In
such a queue, each class (priority and ordinary) has a separate
(logical) queue, and when the server becomes free, the user
from the head of the priority-class queue, if non-empty, enters
the server and it is served. Still, the primary users may suffer
Figure 1. Queue model for the opportunistic access
an impaired performance due to failures in the opportunistic
access coordinated by the secondary operator, e.g. spectrum
sensing limitations and delays. We take this impairment into
account through a non-preemptive variation of the priority-
queue discipline, where the service of the user being served is
always completed, even if priority users may arrive meanwhile.
Finally, we use a First-Come-Fist-Served discipline, although
a Processor Sharing discipline within each priority class could
be easily incorporated in the model.
In our model, the users are the packets to be transmitted;
hence, priority (resp. ordinary) packets are those packets
that pay to the primary (resp. secondary) operator and are
queued in the priority (resp. ordinary) queue. We assume that
priority packets (resp. ordinary packets) arrive to the system
according to a Poisson process with rate λ1 (resp. λ2), and the
transmission time of all packets is exponentially distributed
with mean x = 1/µ. The packets wait for service in a queue
with infinite length. Using Kendall notation, our system is
an M/M/1 queue. Packets are not only homogeneous in their
service time requirements, but also in their preferences on the
timeliness of the service. Specifically, we model the quality a
packet gets from the time it takes to complete transmission if
it has paid to Operator i (i = 1 for the primary operator, and
i = 2 for the secondary operator) as Qi = c · T
−α
i , where Ti
is the mean service time and 0 < α < 1.
As regards the operators, each one charges a price for
transmitting a packet, that is, the primary operator charges a
price p1 to each priority packet, and the secondary operator
charges a price p2 to each ordinary packet. We assume that no
cost is incurred by the operators, so that Operator i’s profit Πi
is given by the revenue flow λipi.
The rate at which priority packets (resp. ordinary packets)
arrive at the system and pay for service will then be guided by
the price p1 charged by the primary operator (resp. secondary
operator) and the quality Q1 (resp. Q2). Flow i (i = 1 for
the priority packets, and i = 2 for the ordinary packets) will
adjust its rate λi so that the utility
ui , Qi − pi (1)
is greater than or equal to zero—we assume that packets get
zero utility from not being transmitted. We call the adjustment
of λi the flow i’s subscription decision. The pricing decision—
i.e, the selection of pi—is taken by each operator indepen-
dently from each other so as to maximizing its profit Πi.
III. GAME MODEL
From the model description above we can observe the
following strategic interactions:
• Flow i’s subscription decision is influenced by Oper-
ator i’s pricing decision.
• Operator i’s profit is influenced by Flow i’s subscrip-
tion decision.
• Flow i’s subscription decision is also influenced by
Flow j’s decision (j 6= i), through the Qi factor.
• Operator i’s profit is influenced by Operator j’s pric-
ing decision, indirectly through Flow j’s subscription
decision.
We conclude then that the above strategic scenario is amenable
to game theory. Specifically, we will use a two-stage sequential
game of the multi-leader-follower kind, where (1) in the first
stage, each operator chooses its pricing strategy pi in order to
maximize its profit Πi; and (2) in the second stage, each packet
flow takes its own subscription decision, trying to maximize
the utility it gets from either subscribing or not.
In the second stage, each flow observes the price posted
by its serving operator and then makes its decision. Assuming
that the number of packets arriving during one time period
is high enough, the individual subscription decision of one
packet does not affect the utility that the rest of the packets
from either flow get. Under this setting, the equilibrium will
be reached as postulated by Wardrop1. Applying this notion
of equilibrium, known as Wardrop equilibrium, to the flow
subscription problem, we postulate that λ∗i (or equivalently,
ρ∗i = λ
∗
i x) will be such that either ρi > 0 and ui = 0; or
ρi = 0 and ui < 0. Therefore, four cases result::
Case 1 u1 = 0 and u2 = 0, so that
Qi − pi = 0 i = 1, 2 (2)
Case 2 u1 = 0 and u2 < 0, in particular, ρ2 = 0
Case 3 u1 < 0 and u2 = 0, in particular, ρ1 = 0
Case 4 u1 < 0 and u2 < 0, in particular, ρ1 = ρ2 = 0
In the first stage, the two operators choose their respective
prices in a simultaneous and independent way. Each operator
is not only aware of the flow subscription decision in the
second stage, but also of the rational behavior of the competing
operator, who is choosing its strategy at the same stage.
Under this setting, the equilibrium concept is the Subgame
Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) [15], where, given that the
flows will optimally decide as postulated above, the pricing
strategy chosen by each operator will be such that
p∗1 =argmax
p1
Π1(p1, p
∗
2) (3)
p∗2 =argmax
p2
Π2(p
∗
1, p2). (4)
1Within the context of trasport networks, and assuming that users choose
routes trying to minimize travel costs, Wardrop’s first principle states: The
journey times in all routes actually used are equal and less than those which
would be experienced by a single vehicle on any unused route [14].
IV. MONOPOLY
We begin by the case where there is only one operator pro-
viding service, namely, the primary operator, so that no priority
is implemented and the operator behaves as a monopolist. This
case will be used as a benchmark for the analysis of the dupoly
scenario.
The queue model is thus an M/M/1 queue with a packet
traffic of ρ = λx. The expression for the mean service time is
then
T =
ρx
1− ρθ
+ x =
x
1− ρ
, (5)
so that the quality is
Q(ρ) = c
(
x
1− ρ
)
−α
(6)
and the utility is u = Q− p.
We postulate that, given a price p charged by the monopo-
list operator, the (Wardrop) equilibrium results in the following
two alternatives:
Case 1 The amount of packets that pay for service in-
creases until the utility they get drops to zero and
therefore packets are indifferent between either
being transmitted or not. Actually, taking the first
derivative of u with respect to ρ, we check that
∂u
∂ρ < 0. The value ρ which results in u = 0 will
be such that
Q(ρ)− p = 0. (7)
Case 2 The price is so high that no packet pays for
service, that is u < 0 and ρ = 0. This happens
when Q(0)− p < 0, or cx−α < p.
The monopolist operator has a revenue of
Π = λp =
ρ
x
p. (8)
Given that the traffic reaches the Wardrop equilibrium, the
monopolist will choose p so as to maximize its revenue. For
this, the first derivative of (8) should be equal to zero:
∂Π
∂p
=
1
x
(
ρ+ p
∂ρ
∂p
)
= 0. (9)
Let us first assume that the user equilibrium is as stated in
Case 1. Taking the first derivative of (7) with respecto to p
∂Q
∂ρ
∂ρ
∂p
− 1 = 0 (10)
and using (9), we end up with an equation on ρ,
Q+ ρ
∂Q
∂ρ
= 0. (11)
Substituting (6), we can solve (11) for the equilibrium traffic
ρm =
1
1 + α
(12)
which is lower that 1.
Using (10) and (9), we can compute the profit-maximizing
price as
pm = −ρm
∂Q
∂ρ
= c
(
α
x(1 + α)
)α
= cx−α
(
α
1 + α
)α
.
(13)
Note that pm < cx
−α, consistent with assuming Case 1. And
the monopoly profit as
Πm =
ρm
x
pm = cx
−(1+α) α
α
(1 + α)1+α
. (14)
V. DUOPOLY
In this section we analyze the case where the primary
and secondary operator are both operating in the market. We
proceed to derive the equilibrium values for the priority and
ordinary traffic, and the operators’ prices and profits.
Let us define, for each flow i = 1, 2, the mean service
time Ti , Wi + T
′
i , where Wi is the mean waiting time
until transmission begins, and T ′i , the mean transmission time.
And the quantities ρi , λix. Let us compute the above
quantities for the M/M/1 non-preemptive priority queue [16].
The residual service time for all packets is R = (ρ1 + ρ2)x.
The mean waiting time for each flow is given by
W1 =
R
1− ρ1
(15)
W2 =
R
(1− ρ1)(1− (ρ1 + ρ2))
(16)
and T ′i = x, since preemption is not allowed. The expressions
for the mean service times are then
T1 =
1 + ρ2
1− ρ1
x (17)
T2 =
1− ρ1(1− (ρ1 + ρ2))
(1− ρ1)(1− (ρ1 + ρ2))
x. (18)
And the expressions for the quality are
Q1(ρ1, ρ2) = c
(1− ρ1)
α
(1 + ρ2)α
x−α (19)
Q2(ρ1, ρ2) = c
(1− ρ1)
α(1− (ρ1 + ρ2))
α
(1− ρ1(1− (ρ1 + ρ2)))α
x−α. (20)
A. User equilibrium
We obtain the equilibrium values for ρ1 and ρ2, for given
values of p1 and p2 according to the Wardrop equilibria stated
in Section III.
1) Case 1: The conditions u1 = 0 and u2 = 0 give
equilibrium values ρ1 and ρ2 such that Q1(ρ1, ρ2) − p1 = 0
and Q2(ρ1, ρ2)− p2 = 0.
2) Case 2: Since ρ2 = 0, (19) and (20) become
Q1(ρ1, 0) = c(1− ρ1)
αx−α (21)
Q2(ρ1, 0) = c
(1− ρ1)
2α
(1− ρ1(1− ρ1))α
x−α. (22)
Solving u1 = Q1(ρ1, 0)− p1 = 0 for ρ1, we obtain
ρ1,0 = 1− x
(p1
c
)1/α
. (23)
On the other hand, the condition u2 < 0 is held for
p2 > pˆ2 = Q2(ρ1,0, 0) = c
x2α
(
p1
c
)2
(1− (1− x
(
p1
c
)1/α
)x
(
p1
c
)1/α
)α
x−α.
(24)
Note that ρ2 = 0 means that Operator 2’s profit is zero.
3) Case 3: Since ρ1 = 0, (19) and (20) become
Q1(0, ρ2) = c(1 + ρ2)
−αx−α (25)
Q2(0, ρ2) = c(1− ρ2)
αx−α. (26)
Solving u2 = Q2(0, ρ2)− p2 = 0 for ρ2, we obtain
ρ2,0 = 1− x
(p2
c
)1/α
. (27)
On the other hand, the condition u1 < 0 is held for
p1 > pˆ1 = Q1(0, ρ2,0) = c(2− x
(p2
c
)1/α
)−αx−α. (28)
Note that ρ1 = 0 means that Operator 1’s profit is zero.
4) Case 4: Finally, assuming ρ1 = ρ2 = 0, (19) and (20)
become
Q1(0, 0) = cx
−α (29)
Q2(0, 0) = cx
−α. (30)
The condition u1 < 0 is held for p1 > Q1(0, 0) = cx
−α.
The same applies to p2, that is, p2 > cx
−α. Note that ρ1 =
ρ2 = 0 means that both operator’s profits are zero.
As a corollary, price values for Case 1 are defined by the
opposite of (28) and (24), that is,
p1 ≤ pˆ1 p2 ≤ pˆ2. (31)
B. Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium
We proceed to compute the equilibrium values for p1 and
p2, assuming that the values for ρ1 and ρ2 (for given values
p1 and p2) are the ones from the previous subsection.
Let us first assume that Case 1 holds. We use (2) and we
compute its first derivative, so that for each packet flow i
∂Qi
∂ρi
∂ρi
∂pi
− 1 = 0. (32)
On the other hand, from (4), the first-order condition for
Operator i results in
∂Πi
∂pi
=
1
x
(
ρi + pi
∂ρi
∂pi
)
= 0. (33)
Proceeding in a similar way to Section IV, we can obtain the
equilibrium traffic ρi for packet flow i from
Qi + ρi
∂Qi
∂ρi
= 0 (34)
and compute the equilibrium price pi and profit Πi for Oper-
ator i as
pi = −ρi
∂Qi
∂ρi
(35)
Πi =
ρi
x
pi. (36)
The first partial derivatives of (19) and (20) are
∂Q1
∂ρ1
= c
x−α
(1 + ρ2)α
α(1− ρ1)
α−1(−1) (37)
∂Q2
∂ρ2
= −c(1− ρ1)
αx−αα
(1− (ρ1 + ρ2))
α−1
(1− ρ1(1− (ρ1 + ρ2)))α+1
.
(38)
Solving (34) for operator 1 gives
ρ1 =
1
1 + α
(39)
while the solution for operator 2 is
ρ2 =
1 + α− 2ρ1 + 2ρ
2
1 −
√
1 + 2α− 4αρ1 + 4αρ21 + α
2
−2ρ1
.
(40)
Finally, values for prices and profits can be computed respec-
tively from (35) and (36), using (37) and (38).
Note that ρ1 and ρ2 are positive, and we will check
numerically in next section that first, equilibrium prices comply
with (31) and, second, profits are also positive. This rules out
that the SPNE lies in either Case 4 (since either operator will
raise its profit by reducing its price below cx−α), Case 2 (since
operator 2 will raise its profit by reducing its price below pˆ2)
or Case 3 (since operator 1 will raise its profit by reducing its
price below pˆ1).
C. Results and discussion
In this section, numerical values are computed for the
equilibrium traffic, prices, and profits for the primary and
secondary operators. The values are compared against the
monopoly scenario.
We set parameters x = 1, and c = 1, and we vary
α ∈ [0.1, 0.9]. Fig. 2 shows the equilibrium traffic for the
monopolist (ρm), the primary (ρ1) and the secondary (ρ2)
operators. It also shows ρ1 + ρ2. Fig. 3 shows the equilibrium
prices and Fig. 4 shows the equilibrium profits.
We can see that:
• The carried traffic by the primary operator is the same
that would have carried if operating as a monopolist,
i.e. ρ1 = ρm. Additionally, the system is able to
accommodate ordinary packets (up to ρ2) paying for
service to the entrant (secondary) operator. This was
analytically derived in (39) and (40).
• The primary operator suffers a decrease in its profits
when a secondary operator enters the market.
• As α increases, the monopolist is able to carry less
traffic, and therefore its profit decreases. This may be
explained by the fact that, as α increases, a given mean
service time value T translates into a lower utility.
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Figure 2. Equilibrium traffic values
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Figure 3. Equilibrium prices
• The effect of α on the primary operator traffic, price
and profits is roughly the same as the effect on the
monopolist.
• As α increases, the carried traffic by the secondary
operator increases, but its profit increases only up to
α ≈ 0.25.
• As α increases, the amount of total traffic that the
duopoly can accommodate decreases, which is a sim-
ilar effect as in the monopoly.
Fig. 3 also shows the threshold price pˆ1 (resp. pˆ2) which
sets the maximum price for which Operator 1 (resp. Operator
2) would get positive profits. The graph shows that equilibrium
prices p1 and p2 keep under these threshold values, confirming
the assumption in Section V-B that SPNE is in the region
defined by Case 1.
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Figure 4. Equilibrium profits
D. Entry analysis
As stated in the discussion above, the incumbent operator
is worse off when a secondary operator enters the market. We
discuss in this section whether an incentive can be provided
so that the former is willing to let the latter enter.
Let m be a lump sum payment to be made by the entrant
operator to the incumbent operator. This payment should not
only make the incumbent better off, that is, Π1 +m ≥ Πm,
but also allow the entrant to make non-negative profits, that is,
Π2−m ≥ 0. Joining the two condition we obtain Πm−Π1 ≤
m ≤ Π2. Thus, a necessary (and sufficient) condition for the
existence of a feasible payment is
Π1 +Π2 ≥ Πm. (41)
In other words, if the total profit in the duopoly case is at
least the same as in the monopoly case, both operators might
be able to agree to redistribute their profits (via a lump sum
payment) in such a way that both of them win with respect
to the monopolistic situation; and will not be able to agree
otherwise. As Fig. 4 shows, this condition is fulfilled for a
range of values of α up to α ≈ 0.65.
VI. CAPACITY LEASING
As an alternative scenario to the one modeled so far, the
incumbent operator may lease an amount µ2 of its capacity
µ, to the entrant operator, keeping an amount µ1 = µ − µ2.
Under this leasing agreement, Operator i provides service
using an exclusive capacity µi. This scenario is shown in
Fig. 5. Expression for each flow’s utility and each operator’s
profit are the following:
ui = cT
−α
i − pi (42)
Πi =
ρi
xi
pi = ρiµipi. (43)
Due to the lack of interaction between the service received
by packets from each flow, first, Ti can be computed as the
Figure 5. Queue model for the leasing agreement
mean service time of an M/M/1 queue with µi capacity, that is,
Ti =
1
µi(1−ρi)
; and second, Operator i behaves as a monopolist
with respect to the flow i, so that (12), (13) and (14) from
Section IV can be reused:
ρi =
1
1 + α
(44)
pi = c
(
αµi
1 + α
)α
(45)
Πi = ρiµipi = cµ
1+α
i
αα
(1 + α)1+α
. (46)
Note the following results. First, the system is able to carry
the same traffic as the monopolist. Actually, using (44), and
comparing with (12)
(λ1 + λ2)x = (ρ1µ1 + ρ2µ2)x =
1
1 + α
(µ1 + µ2)x
= ρmµx = ρm. (47)
And, from Section V-B, we know that the opportunistic access
solution is able to carry more traffic than the monopolist.
Second, the system achieves lower total profits than the
monopolist. Actually, using (46) and comparing with (14)
Π1 +Π2 = c
αα
(1 + α)1+α
(µ1+α1 + µ
1+α
2 ) (48)
Πm = c
αα
(1 + α)1+α
(µ1 + µ2)
1+α (49)
Π1 +Π2 ≤ Πm (50)
which does not comply with (41).
The above results allows us to conclude, respectively,
that the leasing solution cannot carry as much traffic as the
opportunistic solution analized in Section V; and that there is
no feasible payment to provide incentives to the incumbent
operator. Thus, the leasing solution is inefficient and is not
incentive compatible.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER WORK
A scenario where a primary operator and a secondary
operator provide service in a cognitive radio network has been
modeled. The economic viability of supporting the secondary
operator service using an opportunistic access to the spectrum
owned by the primary operator has been assessed. Against the
benchmark of the primary operator operating as a monopolist,
we conclude that the entry of the secondary operator is
desirable from an efficiency perspective, since the carried
traffic increases. Additionally, for a range of parameter values,
a lump sum payment can be designed so that the incumbent
operator has an incentive to let the secondary operator enter.
The opportunistic access setting has been compared against
a leasing-based alternative, and we have concluded that the
former outperforms the latter.
Future lines of work may include to model packet hetero-
geneity in utility and to analyze a mixed setting where part of
the capacity is exclusively leased and part of it is shared under
a priority scheme.
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